A number of months in the past, a reporter from a nationwide outlet known as to speak about Chevron deference in immigration. Apparently, immigration attorneys have been (quietly) thrilled that Chevron deference was on the chopping block. That call requires the Board of Immigration Appeals to defer to the chief department when decoding an “ambiguous” provision of the immigration legal guidelines. Most immigration attorneys are left of heart, and they didn’t dare file an amicus temporary on this subject in Loper Vibrant, however I’ve heard they have been eagerly trying ahead to the Courtroom’s resolution. And such has come to go.
Certainly, Justice Gorsuch cites immigration regulation as a justification to overrule Chevron.
In one other case, one which I heard as a courtroom of appeals choose, De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F. 3d 1165 (CA10 2015), the Board of Immigration Appeals invoked Chevron to overrule a judicial precedent on which many immigrants had relied, see In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 370 (BIA 2007) (purporting to overrule Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F. 3d 1294 (CA10 2005)). The company then sought to use its new interpretation retroactively to punish these immigrants—together with Alfonzo De Niz Robles, who had relied on that judicial precedent as authority to stay on this nation along with his U. S. spouse and 4 kids. See 803 F. 3d, at 1168–1169. Our courtroom dominated that this retrospective software of the BIA’s new interpretation of the regulation violated Mr. De Niz Robles’s due course of rights. Id., at 1172. However as a decrease courtroom, we may deal with solely the symptom, not the illness. So Chevron permitted the company going ahead to overrule a judicial resolution about the perfect studying of the regulation with its personal completely different “cheap” one and in that manner deny reduction to numerous future immigrants.
Justice Kagan additionally alluded to immigration in her dissent. She means that–contra Justice Gorsuch–the Courtroom would nonetheless permit deference doctrines in immigration instances that contain “blended questions” of truth and regulation:
It first seems to differentiate between “pure authorized query[s]” and the so-called blended questions in Grey and Hearst, involving the appliance of a authorized normal to a set of details. Ante, at 11. If in drawing that distinction, the bulk intends to restrict its holding to the pure sort of authorized subject—thus enabling courts to defer when regulation and details are entwined—I would be glad. However I believe the bulk has no such intent, as a result of that method would protect Chevron in a considerable a part of its present area. Cf. Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U. S. 209, 230 (2024) (ALITO, J., dissenting) (noting, within the immigration context, that the universe of blended questions swamps that of pure authorized ones).
For additional studying, see this article on immigration regulation after Relentless within the NYU Legislation Evaluate On-line.
